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ANALYSIS

Why the Veto Hurts More Than You Think
ees under Rule 19-and they will remain
wild cards who can destroy whatever
settlement the parties reach.

BY SUSAN GROVER
he Civil Rights Act of 1990 is dead.
Its slayers-chief among them
President George Bush--claim to
have made the business world safe from
dreaded employment quotas.
In fact, they have given some employers an even bigger prize: a good chance of
avoiding altogether litigation to correct
systemic workplace discrimination.
For minority employees challenging
workplace practices under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, consent decrees
have been the primary vehicle for institutional reform. Such court-approved
settlements, which generally establish affrrmative-action plans , have promised the
cheapest and speediest resolution to many
discrimination suits.
Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, a
1989 Supreme Court decision , changed
that. In that case, the Court exposed consent decrees to interminable "reverse
discrimination " attacks by white employees who complain of the affrrmative action
called for by such decrees. The vetoed
civil-rights bill included a provision to
reverse that decision, restoring the status
of a fairly drawn consent decree as generally binding on all affected employees.
With President Bush' s veto of the bill
(which the Senate sustained on Oct. 24),
consent decrees to settle discrimination
suits are at risk of becoming useless. And
if consent decrees are at risk, so is employment discrimination litigation itself.
The reasons for this assessment are
complicated, but bear out such pessimism.
Before Wilks, most federal appellate
courts recognized an "impermissible collateral attack doctrine ," which effectively
required white employees who wished to
challenge a consent decree in a discrimination case to intervene in the suit in question. The doctrine encouraged parties to
settle their disputes and avoided duplicative litigation.
In Wilks, the Supreme Court rejected
this doctrine. Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice William Rehnquist concluded that
the practice of binding non-parties to the
terms of a settlement was inconsistent with
the scheme of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP), which contemplates
permissive, as opposed to mandatory,
intervention.

T

Problematic Proffer
Wilks proffers to employers and minority employees a different procedural
device for preventing subsequent suits by
white employees. But the Wilks "solution" is fraught with problems for black
plaintiffs-and ultimately is no solution at
all.
Wilks would have discrimination plaintiffs use FRCP 19 to bring in as partiesin other words, to "join"-the white
employees in the suit that may give rise to
a decree. The result of joining all white
employees who may be affected by an affirmative-action plan will in almost all
cases be an extremely complex and unwieldy suit at best.
But unwieldiness and complexity are
the least of the hurdles. Rule 19 joinder
suffers from even more severe limitations
that make it a completely inadequate
means of producing and protecting consent decrees.
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Wilks did not
predict the outcome that Rule 19 would or
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Spoilers at Large
Another important component of Rule
19 has the potential to backfire on civilrights plaintiffs . The rule requires joinder
if it appears that the suit will result in a
judgment prejudicial to the nonparties' -white employees' -interests.
Before Wilks , white employees who
would be barred from subsequently challenging a consent decree could be joined
under this test. Wilks , though, cut off the
possibility that the absent white employees
will be injured-because it guarantees that
they will have an opportunity to fIle an
independent suit. Again, no joinder required , and the white employees remain
potential spoilers at large.
Of course, some courts might require
joinder of white employees under the
conflicting-obligations criterion of the
rule, perhaps even seeing the Wilks opinion as an invitation to do so. Even here ,
the situation presents serious hazards for
plaintiffs. Besides yielding unwieldy suits
in some of these cases, in others , application of Rule 19 will yield no suit at all.
This is because the rule gives the court
discretion to dismiss the suit entirely if jurisdiction cannot be obtained over all
white employees who must be joined under the rule. Rather than protecting against
challenges to the decree, then , Rule 19
may simply put the plaintiffs out of court.
Even assuming that Rule 19 can yield a
manageable case which includes the white
employees as parties, their joinder will
have little effect if the suit is settled by a
consent decree. Although joined as parties , white employees will not be bound by
a consent decree between the employer
and minority employees unless they accept
the terms of the decree.
There is nothing the other parties can do
to force the white employees, once joined,
to accept the decree; they are free to reject
it and may succeed in dismissing their part
of the current suit and bring a subsequent
discrimination suit based on race-con~ scious decisions made pursuant to the deo
cree. To forestall these subsequent suits,
~z the employer and minority employees
must litigate to a final, binding judgment
after the majority employees have been
joined. Obviously this thwarts the Title
VII policy favoring settlement of discrimination cases.
President aush's rejection of the civilrights bill is more than an attack on quotas;
its effect will be to subvert entirely the use
of consent decrees in employment discrimination litigation. Consent decrees
promise a more efficient, more flexible
resolution to employment discrimination
suits than full adjudication on the merits
can provide . Unless consent decrees are
protected from subsequent attacks in reverse discrimination suits, the danger of
ployees could lead to a judgment requiring
these attacks will outweigh the decrees'
promotion or hiring decisions different
advantages . The only "protection"
from those required by the consent decree.
available at present-joinder of majority
But other judges will not require joinder
employees under Rule 19 of the Federal
Rules-is illUSOry.
unless the employer would have to violate
the consent decree to comply with the
Much of the public attention to the Civil
judgment in a subsequent suit. If a decree
Rights Act of 1990, and President Bush's
required that an employer promote a miveto, has focused on disputes over the alnority employee to a stated position and
locations of burdens of proof between
the subsequent judgment required that the
employer~ and plaintiffs in suits charging
employer promote a majority employee to
umntentIOnal but systemic bias in the
workplace. The defeat of the civil-rights
the same position, the employer might be
able to promote both. This response may
bill and the continued force of Martin v.
be uneconomical , disruptive, and illogiWilks, however , promise to bring incal, but it is not impossible. As long as
stitutional civil-rights litigation to its
compliance with both the decree and the
knees at a much more fundamental level.
later judgment is possible , s0'!l~ courts . .Bur~ens of proof? No matter, these cases
~~Il. ~:c!iE: ~~~¥.2r.: ~h: _v:~i~e_ :~p'loy:. __ :~o~ :t!:,:~,~e; ?~f. t~':~~~~.?,<!.~Yrr:~r~:

All the talk of quotas and burdens of
proof has diverted attention from the
traps President George Bush
set-perhaps unwittingly-for
discrimination victims by rejecting
the civil-rights bill.
.
should yield in these cases. He simply
pointed to the rule as the only device
available to plaintiffs who wish to bind
white employees by a consent decree.
The problem is that Rule 19 frequently
won't do the job. Some courts will construe the rule not to require joinder of
white employees in the original suit, and
will reject plaintiffs' efforts to invoke Rule
19. Courts have interpreted the rule to require that non-parties-like the white
employees in a discrimination suit-be
joined only when it is likely that the defendant-employer will be otherwise be
threatened by conflicting obligations.
And courts disagree on what constitutes
this threat. Some judges will require Rule
19 joinder if a laJ~r suit. by. the white . ~m-
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